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POST-EARTHQUAKE LEGAL REFORM 
IN HAITI: IN ON THE GROUND FLOOR 
Leonard L. Cavise 
INTRODUCTION 
he old European way of trying criminal cases, the so-
called inquisitorial system, is dying. Throughout Latin 
America, countries have passed new codes of criminal proce-
dure that have adopted the party system, similar to the accusa-
torial system in the United States. Even in Europe, lawyers 
and lawmakers are advocating for a more open and adversarial 
system. They have managed to enact new legislation calling, at 
least, for an end to the secrecy of the old procedures, a greater 
role for lawyers, and a more oral and public system for trying 
cases.1 Most dramatically, in France, the birthplace of the Eu-
ropean model, President Sarkozy, in 2009, called to replace the 
centerpiece of the inquisitorial system, the juge d’instruction, 
with a more party-oriented judge and to transfer the duties of 
investigation to the public prosecutor.2 Considering that Napo-
                                                                                                                                  
 Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Public Interest Law and 
Interim Director of the International Human Rights Law Institute at the 
DePaul College of Law. I wish to thank the International Senior Lawyers 
Project for involving me in Haiti’s criminal justice reform project. Please note 
that to the extent this Article includes un-cited assertions, I have made my 
inferences based on my participation in, and materials and notes from, the 
conferences to reform the Haitian Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure 
Codes. 
 1. Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The 
Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal 
Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 26–29 (2004); to understand the complexi-
ties of the Italian experience, see Ennio Amodio, The Accusatorial System 
Lost and Regained: Reforming Criminal Procedure in Italy, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 
489, 489, 492–95 (2004). 
 2. At a session before the Cour de cassation, France’s highest court, Sar-
kozy said: “Le juge d’instruction en la forme actuelle ne peut être arbitre. Il 
est donc temps que le juge d’instruction cède la place à un juge de 
l’instruction qui contrôlera le déroulement de l’enquête mais ne la dirigera 
plus.” (The committing magistrate in its present form can only be a referee. It 
is therefore time that the committing magistrate cedes his position to the 
juge de l’instruction who will guide the progress of the inquiry but will not 
direct it.) Sarkozy confirme la fin du juge d’instruction [Sarkozy Confirms the 
End of the Committing Magistrate], LIBÉRATION, Jan. 7, 2009, 
http://www.liberation.fr/societe/0101310147-sarkozy-veut-supprimer-le-juge-
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leon birthed the inquisitorial system in France in 1808, it is 
significant that a French President himself is calling for such a 
major reform. The inquisitorial system appears to be in its 
death throes. 
In 2008, President René Préval of the Republic of Haiti ap-
pointed two commissions (“the Commissions”) to revise the Pe-
nal and Criminal Procedure Codes of Haiti. The Codes had not 
been revised since 1835, when the Republic was just getting on 
its feet after the slave rebellion of 1803. Both the substantive 
and the procedural codes were drawn from the codes of France, 
then known, of course, as the Napoleonic Codes. They reflected 
the inquisitorial system of criminal justice, which centers 
around the juge d’instruction. 
By the time of President Préval’s decision in 2008, Haiti was 
already well behind in the Latin American movement to transi-
tion its criminal justice systems from the inquisitorial to the 
accusatorial or adversarial model. As part of that movement, 
and encouragement via foreign aid from the United States, 
over twenty nations recodified their law and procedure, hoping 
to modernize the system, minimize the endemic weaknesses of 
the European model, and to attract foreign investment by 
providing a more predictable legal environment.3 
President Préval named René Magloire, a former Minister of 
Justice, as chair of the Haitian Commissions.4 Magloire, partly 
because of his two terms as Minister of Justice, is a very well 
known legal personality in Haiti and a close friend of Préval’s. 
It was Magloire’s task to not only draft the new Codes but also 
to convince the practicing bar, which was heavily influenced by 
the French model, and the larger society to accept these re-
forms as a part of Haiti’s ongoing attempts to launch a func-
tioning criminal justice system. 
The challenges of such a reform were overwhelming in view 
of Haiti’s daunting lack of resources, pervasive corruption, 
                                                                                                                                  
d-instruction (Fr.). See also, Alain Salles, M. Sarkozy envisage de supprimer 
le juge d’instruction [Mr. Sarkozy Considers Eliminating the Committing 
Magistrate], LE MONDE, Jan. 6, 2009, 
http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2009/01/06/m-sarkozy-envisage-de-
supprimer-le-juge-d-instruction_1138259_823448.html (Fr.). 
 3. Maximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: 
Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 630–31 
(2007). 
 4. The Haitian Commissions consist of the Commission to Reform the 
Criminal Procedure Law of the Republic of Haiti and the Commission to Re-
form the Criminal Law of the Republic of Haiti. 
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their history of impunity in police conduct,5 and the resistance 
of the more traditional Francophiles and others invested in the 
maintenance of the present system. Additionally, the cata-
strophic earthquake in 2010 devastated Haiti, particularly the 
capital, Port-au-Prince, and caused the death of a number of 
the important players in the reform project.6 Almost miracu-
lously, the project continued with the completion—an implau-
sible three weeks after the earthquake—of another draft of the 
procedural Code and with the convening of the next interna-
tional conference of the Commissions a mere two months later. 
Part I of this Article will briefly describe the general histori-
cal and political antecedents to this reform initiative, including 
several of the previous projects to strengthen and solidify the 
Haitian criminal justice system. Part II will describe the Hai-
tian criminal justice system as it presently exists, including its 
perceived deficiencies, as background to this law reform pro-
cess. Part III will describe the reform process as the author 
viewed it. This description will touch upon the key elements of 
the discussion and the attempt by the Commissions and its in-
vited guests to adopt the essence of the party system while 
adapting it to the legal cultural life of Haiti. Part IV describes 
the influence of the French in Haiti today and the effects of 
that influence on the reform process. Part V describes the his-
toric first conference and the divergency of views on the neces-
sity and direction of procedural reform. In Part VI, a descrip-
tion of the content of the new Haitian Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure Codes is begun with an exposition of the human rights 
preamble to the Criminal Procedure Code, which is key to pub-
lic acceptance of the Codes. That preamble and the human 
rights provisions in other parts of the procedural Code are in-
teresting particularly for the international norms adopted and 
the preservation of some traditional Haitian values. Part VII 
discusses other key procedural Code provisions, beginning with 
                                                                                                                                  
 5. Impunity refers generally to what Americans would call the arbitrary 
or capricious use of power without due process. 
 6. Particularly noteworthy, in this regard, is the death of Micha Gaillard, 
the Chair of the public advocate’s portion of the Commission. José de Córdo-
ba, Micha Gaillard, Fought for Democracy, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703822404575019190559786
092.html. 
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components of the accusatorial or party system that were re-
jected. In Part VIII, the accusatorial features that are accepted, 
in whole or in part, are outlined. Part IX describes possible in-
frastructure reform that will be necessary to implement the full 
slate of proposed reforms, along with, in Part X, an assessment 
as to what must happen in Haiti to develop a social consensus 
and thereby implement this dramatic transition. The Article 
concludes that, despite the assistance from foreign resources 
and the hard work and dedication of a cadre of lawyers and 
their allies, the development of a new criminal procedure sys-
tem can only be realized with the development of democratic 
institutions in the country as a whole. 
I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
Haiti had not written a new criminal code for substantive law 
or procedure since the Criminal Codes of 1835.7 Various new 
crimes, such as crimes outlawing forced labor and anti-drug 
trafficking laws, have been inserted into the existing Codes 
since then,8 but there has never been a comprehensive revision, 
which is particularly remarkable in a code-based legal system. 
It is estimated that fully 165 legal or administrative provisions 
                                                                                                                                  
 7. CODE D’INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE [C.I.C.] (Haiti), translated in 
GENDARMERIE TRANSLATION OF THE CODE PÉNAL AND THE CODE D’INSTRUCTION 
CRIMINELLE (1922). 
 8. Many supplemental laws to the criminal code were passed by executive 
order rather than passing through parliament. Aside from the highly irregu-
lar nature of these laws, many of them are unknown even to the legal com-
munity. Some of these additional laws were introduced by the “Decret du 7 
avril 1982” which is an attempt to harmonize Haitian law with various inter-
national conventions and treaties that the Government of Haiti had signed or 
to change some legal definitions, e.g., the definition of rape. Décret du 7 avril 
1982 harmonisant la Législation pénale en vigueur avec les Conventions In-
ternationales signées et ratifiées par le Gouvernement Haïtien [Decree Har-
monizing the Penal Code with International Conventions Signed and Ratified 
by the Haitian Government], in ORG. AM. STATES, L’Entraide Judiciaire en 
Matière Pénale et d’Extradition [Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 
and Extradition], 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/fr/hti/fr_hti_penal.html#_Toc37077164. See 
HANS JOERG ALBRECHT, LOUIS AUCOIN & VIVIENNE O’CONNOR, UNITED STATES 
INSTITUTE OF PEACE, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW IN HAITI: NEW LAWS FOR A 
NEW ERA 2 (2009); see also Décret du 6 juillet 2005 modifiant le régime des 
Agressions Sexuelles et éliminant en la matière les Discriminations contre la 
Femme [Decree Modifying Rape and Eliminating Discrimination Against 
Women], in LE MONITEUR (Haiti), Aug. 11, 2005, at 1–6. 
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in the Codes are no longer relevant in the modern era.9 New 
codes were passed, by contrast, in other legal disciplines such 
as the Labor Law in 1961, the Rural Code in 1962, and the 
Code of Civil Procedure in 1963.10 
The Criminal Codes of 1835 were based entirely on the 
French system of law drafted in France between 1804 and 
1812.11 Known as the inquisitorial system, the French system 
features the key role of the investigating judge, the juge 
d’instruction, and lesser roles for the attorneys. The inquisito-
rial system has a long investigatory phase that is closed to the 
parties and the public. The juge d’instruction is charged with 
not only investigating, but also evaluating and judging the 
case. Oral trials were not conducted nor was there provision for 
any oral proceedings. The role of lawyers was normally con-
fined to arguments at a proceeding that most resembles sen-
tencing in the American system. Appeal is de novo. The victim 
is a full party, entitled to the same participation as the other 
two parties. The dossier used by the judge to investigate is 
commonly replete with second and third party statements ra-
ther than statements from persons with personal knowledge.12 
Many European countries and virtually all of the countries of 
Latin America mimicked the French system and adopted what 
was commonly called the Napoleonic Code for their criminal 
justice systems. Over time, the structural weaknesses of the 
French system became more apparent, and critics decried the 
extended delays, the secrecy of proceedings, the lack of advoca-
cy during the guilt-innocence phase, prolonged pretrial deten-
tion, lack of confrontation or cross-examination of witnesses, 
and lack of written decisions based upon a record. Added to 
that were the additional dysfunctions of impunity, police cor-
                                                                                                                                  
 9. INT’L CRISIS GROUP, KEEPING HAITI SAFE: JUSTICE REFORM 10 (2011) 
[hereinafter KEEPING HAITI SAFE]. 
 10. See Marisol Florén-Romero, Researching Haitian Law, GLOBALEX 
(May/June 2008), http://nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Haiti.htm. 
 11. Haiti, FOREIGN LAW GUIDE: CURRENT SOURCES OF CODES AND BASIC 
LEGISLATION IN JURISDICTIONS OF THE WORLD, 
http://www.foreignlawguide.com/ip/flg/Haiti.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). 
 12. RICHARD VOGLER, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE, in COMPARATIVE 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 14, 19–21 (noting that the dossier must contain “all 
available evidence”). For a more complete treatment of the traditional French 
inquisitorial system, see id. at 14–95. 
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ruption, and long post-trial sentences in depraved prison condi-
tions, adding impetus to reform movements, first in Europe 
and then elsewhere.13 
Though many countries considered modernizing or transi-
tioning their criminal systems to the accusatorial model, a re-
form movement did not take hold in Latin America until the 
1980s. In the following twenty years, over half of the nations of 
Latin America managed at least to pass new codes of criminal 
law and procedure, which reflected the accusatorial or “party” 
model of criminal justice.14 Though there is only basic similari-
ty in the codes adopted, the principal features of this system, 
familiar to American trial lawyers, are generally included in 
the codes of the transition states. Those features include oral 
and public trials, control by the parties of the evidence and 
witnesses presented, party control of the investigation, prose-
cutorial control of the police, prosecutorial discretion in charg-
ing and dismissing decisions, a judge or jury verdict, rules of 
evidence that exclude hearsay and prejudicial information, and 
the power of the parties to plea bargain. 
Many of the law reforms were not complete transitions to the 
adversarial model, but rather to a hybrid system. Adapting the 
adversarial model to their local conditions, some states rejected 
key important American trial features such as the jury, plea 
bargaining, the reduced role of the victim at trial, and appeals 
restricted to questions of law.15 However, many reformers had 
seen the elements of open and adversarial hearings, public tri-
als, power in the prosecutor to bring and dismiss charges, party 
presentation of witnesses and evidence, and prosecutorial con-
trol of the investigating police as key components of the transi-
tion. Other key elements of the party system, plea bargaining 
                                                                                                                                  
 13. MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY & J. R. SPENCER, EUROPEAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURES 11–13, 18–27 (2002). 
 14. Maximo Langer, supra note 3, at 670; Leonard L. Cavise, The Transi-
tion from the Inquisitorial to the Accusatorial System of Trial Procedure: Why 
Some Latin American Lawyers Hesitate, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 785, 785 n.1 
(2007). 
 15. For a collection of research and reports by the Centro de Estudios de la 
Justicia de Las Americas (“CEJA”) on various Latin countries see CENTRO DE 
ESTUDIOS DE JUSTICIA DE LAS AMÉRICAS [JUSTICE STUDIES CENTER OF THE 
AMERICAS], http://www.cejamericas.org/index.php/areas-de-
trabajo/evaluacion-y-seguimiento-de-las-reformas-penales/reformas-a-la-
justicia-penal (last visited Apr. 27, 2013). For a treatment of Mexico’s new 
hybrid system, see William Hine-Ramsberger, Drug Violence and Constitu-
tional Revisions: Mexico’s 2008 Criminal Justice Reform and the Formation of 
the Rule of Law, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 291–317 (2011). 
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in particular, have been subjected to much closer scrutiny and 
remain part of the continuing dialogue. 
Many of the reforms have not yet been realized because most 
countries are still in the implementation phase. Finding the 
resources to train police, prosecutors, defenders, judges, court 
personnel and prison administrators is, in many cases, an im-
ponderable undertaking. Changing the culture of how cases are 
litigated or, more precisely, imposing a party superstructure on 
a civil law foundation requires extensive training. Additionally, 
maintaining the political will to continue with the transition 
will vary with the changing political atmospheres in each coun-
try. In Italy, for example, there have been at least three “resto-
rations” of prior procedure by the Corte di Cassazione,16 and at 
least one “counter-reaction” by a Parliament intent on institu-
tionalizing the new reforms.17 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE HAITI PROJECT 
In 1993, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, twice president of Haiti, 
wrote: 
The need for a judicial system that will bring [human rights 
abusers] to justice is the major concern, the major desire, and 
the major issue for most Haitians. We need to see that justice 
is done and that those who have committed such heinous 
crimes – crimes against humanity – will be brought to jus-
tice.18 
Aristide was speaking of a justice system that, aside from 
and beyond its treatment of crimes against humanity, was 
simply dysfunctional.19 Arbitrary arrest and prolonged deten-
                                                                                                                                  
 16. Luca Marafioti, Italian Criminal Procedure: A System Caught Between 
Two Traditions, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR MIRJAN DAMAŠKA 
81, 91–93 (John Jackson et al. eds., 2008). 
 17. William T. Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to Establish an 
Adversarial Trial System in Italy, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 429, 431–32 (2004). 
 18. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, The Role of the Judiciary in the Transition to 
Democracy, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE 
JUDICIARY 35, 36 (1993). 
 19. Haiti’s criminal justice system and its continual violation of human 
rights have been documented in a number of reports. See, e.g., Alternative 
Chance, et al., Criminal Justice, in UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW, REPUBLIC OF 
HAITI: SUBMISSIONS TO THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 26 (2011). 
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tion,20 torture and summary execution, impunity in prosecu-
tions, corruption,21 secrecy, unending delay, lack of counsel, in-
competent judges, total lack of confrontation, inhumane prison 
conditions22—all of these were but the first glimpse of the pro-
found dysfunction that had become, over many years, the Hai-
tian criminal justice system. Additionally, murder and torture 
by government-employed predators, the Duvaliers’ army 
known as the Tonton Macoutes, were commonplace during the 
many years of the Duvalier dictatorships.23 When, in 1991, 
there was a coup d’état overthrowing the very popular Presi-
                                                                                                                                  
 20. See generally Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Haiti, Rep., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/35 (Apr. 23, 2012) (by Michel Forst). Prior to 
the 2010 earthquake, almost 80% of all inmates in Haiti were pretrial detain-
ees. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT, COUNTRY SUMMARY: HAITI 2 
(2011), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/haiti_1.pdf. Despite a 
Constitutional provision that arrestees can be held only for forty-eight hours 
before seeing a judge, most inmates had never seen a judge. In reality, de-
fendants in 2010 spent an average of 408 days in pretrial detention. Id. at 5. 
 21. Corruption in the judiciary contributes mightily to prolonged pretrial 
detention, involving prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges, all of whom 
extort money. GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI, ACTION PLAN FOR NATIONAL 
RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT OF HAITI: IMMEDIATE KEY INITIATIVES FOR THE 
FUTURE 45 (2010), available at 
http://www.interaction.org/sites/default/files/Haiti%20Action%20Plan%20%2
8English%20version%29.pdf [hereinafter HAITI, ACTION PLAN]. 
 22. It should be noted that, after the January 2010 earthquake, all of the 
5400 prisoners in the Civil Penitentiary, the largest penitentiary in Port-au-
Prince, escaped. Eight months later, only 629 had been recaptured. HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2011: HAITI (2011), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/haiti_1.pdf. At least 
one commentator has called the conditions in Haitian prisons “the worst in 
the world.” Kate Heartfield, Hell is a Haitian Prison, OTTAWA CITIZEN (Can.), 
June 4, 2009, available at 
http://www2.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id=e3a6275b-b474-4a32-
8149-129177f4571c&sponsor=. The U.N. Rule of Law Indicators Project noted 
that “all of Haiti’s prisons were overcrowded prior to the earthquake. Accord-
ing to the report prior to the earthquake: ‘[T]he least crowded prison, in Les 
Coteaux, is at 230% of official capacity and the most crowded facility (Hinche) 
holds more than ten times the number it was designed to hold.’” Christopher 
Stone, A New Era for Justice Sector Reform in Haiti 10 (Harvard Kennedy 
Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP10-033, 2010), available at 
http://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/4448872. 
 23. Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier and his son, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” 
Duvalier ruled the country continuously from 1957 to 1986. See generally 
Sophia Asare, “This Land Cannot Die”: U.S. Involvement in the Rebuilding 
Haiti, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 177, 183–86 (2010). 
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dent Aristide, leading to a three-year reign of terror, the situa-
tion reached a new low: 
The law has been used to reify and reinforce the domination 
of a small elite over the great mass of poor peasants and 
workers, and has almost never functioned to punish even in 
the case of the worst massacres. Even when dictatorial lead-
ers have been overthrown, they have usually been allowed to 
leave the country to join their bank accounts. As a result, the 
Haitian poor justifiably have little faith in the Haitian state 
in general and the legal system in particular.24  
As Haiti struggles now from dictatorship toward a distant 
form of representative democracy, the threat of a return to au-
thoritarian rule is always present, particularly in the face of 
starvation and an ineffective government. As Haiti’s drama un-
folds, the question remains whether the judiciary and the crim-
inal justice system can play a role in regaining the path to de-
velopment and responsive government. Foreign experts regu-
larly ask whether there can ever be rule of law in a country 
that has so little tradition of democracy and has not internal-
ized the importance of the rule of law and the legitimacy of a 
reformed criminal justice system.25 There is no easy response. 
The overwhelming problems in Haiti’s justice sector have not 
escaped international notice. In 2006, the World Bank identi-
fied long delays in the criminal justice system caused by “com-
munication failures between the investigative ‘judicial’ police 
and prosecutors on evidence-gathering and the preparation of 
cases, inadequate tracking and management of case files by 
court clerks, and deficient enforcement of judicial orders for 
prisoner transfers and release.”26 The treatment plan, however, 
concluded that reforms cannot be solely focused on “technical 
capacity building, training, and infrastructure, but instead 
must be integrated into a broader process of state building and 
                                                                                                                                  
 24. Reed Brody, International Aspects of Current Efforts at Judicial Re-
form: Undermining Justice in Haiti, in THE (UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE 
UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA 227, 228 (1999). 
 25. See Irwin P. Stotzky, The Indispensable State, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 201, 
210 (2003). 
 26. CARIBBEAN COUNTRY MANAGEMENT UNIT, WORLD BANK, SOCIAL 
RESILIENCE AND STATE FRAGILITY IN HAITI: A COUNTRY SOCIAL ANALYSIS 55 
(2006). 
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democratic consolidation. . . . The creation of a national con-
stituency in favor of reform is essential to furthering change in 
the police and justice system.”27 This conclusion came after a 
lengthy description of failed reform efforts from international 
donors28 and the “paralysis of disorganization” and dysfunction 
of the Ministry of Justice.29 Most Haitians have felt excluded 
from even having the right to petition the courts,30 unlike the 
high privilege accorded to violent gang leaders31 who not only 
had access to the courts but also to the defense lawyers. Mem-
bers of the bar available to the indigent are few and far be-
tween.32 
In 2005, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(“IACHR”) reported that Haiti’s longstanding problems would 
not change without “urgent reforms to strengthen the admin-
istration of justice and the rule of law in Haiti.”33 The IACHR’s 
analysis of the court system found that many of the laws were 
outdated, that there was a lack of effective access to legal assis-
tance, and that the police failed to execute judicial orders. 
These failures resulted in 85% to 90% of all criminally-accused 
being held in pretrial detention for long periods of time, perva-
sive and prolonged pretrial delay, and widespread impunity for 
state actors.34 Conclusions like these are commonplace. The 
IACHR singled out a number of cases, highlighting in particu-
lar the removal, on December 9, 2005, of five judges of Haiti’s 
Supreme Court by the then-interim President Boniface Alex-
andre, who replaced them with five judges of his own choosing 
apparently without constitutional authority. 35 The IACHR in-
vestigators discovered further dysfunction in the legal system 
                                                                                                                                  
 27. Id. at 58. 
 28. Id. at 53. Both Haitians and international human rights groups have 
criticized some of the efforts of the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment (“USAID”) and its contracting agencies for projects drawn with little or 
no input from local actors or for failure to attend Haitian-led programs. Bro-
dy, supra note 24, at 234. 
 29. CARIBBEAN COUNTRY MANAGEMENT UNIT, supra note 26, at 54. 
 30. Id. at 54. 
 31. Id. at 57. 
 32. Id. at 54. A notable exception is the Institute for Democracy in Haiti, 
which has staff lawyers available to the indigent. 
 33. Org. of Am. States, Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Haiti: Failed 
Justice or the Rule of Law? Challenges Ahead for Haiti and the International 
Community, at v, OEA/Ser/L/V/II.123 (October 26, 2005) [hereinafter Haiti: 
Failed Justice?]. 
 34. Id. at vi. 
 35. Id. at 15–16. 
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when they found that, in 2004, an appallingly low total of only 
six trials were scheduled in the entire country. Of the six, one 
was not heard because the file was not sufficiently prepared; 
another was not heard because the defendant had escaped from 
prison. The court heard three trials in absentia because the de-
fendants had escaped, and one trial resulted in acquittal for the 
co-defendants due to lack of evidence. In that case, the defend-
ants were former leaders of the paramilitary group Front for 
the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (“FRAPH”), who were 
widely known as the Duvaliers’ “death squad” torturers and 
executioners.36 The IACHR ultimately concluded, based upon 
general agreement both internationally and in Haiti specifical-
ly, that there should be a comprehensive redesign and reform 
of the country’s criminal laws.37 
In November 2007, the Haitian Government itself issued a 
“Growth and Poverty Reduction” Strategy Paper designed to 
articulate a vision to “lift Haiti out of poverty and destitu-
tion.”38 In Chapter 7, the government outlined the weaknesses 
in the justice system, such as “executive branch interference in 
the exercise of judicial authority,” corruption, impunity, orga-
nized crime, the public’s inability to understand or trust the 
legal system, long delays, practically nonexistent maintenance 
of criminal records, “arbitrary and abusive” preventive deten-
tion, appalling prison conditions, and the overall lack of train-
ing or adequate salaries.39 The document was dedicated to the 
establishment of an “equitable legal order, a functional judicial 
system, and a general climate of security . . .” wherein justice 
would be “accessible,” “credible,” “independent,” and “effi-
cient.”40 
                                                                                                                                  
 36. Id. at 71–72. 
 37. Id. at 73. 
 38. MINISTÈRE DE LA PLANIFICATION ET DE LA COOPÉRATION EXTERNE 
[MPCE], DOCUMENT DE STRATÉGIE NATIONALE POUR LA CROISSANCE ET LA 
RÉDUCTION DE LA PAUVRETÉ [DSNCRP] (2008–2010): POUR RÉUSSIR LE SAUT 
QUALITATIF [GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPER] 14–16 (2007) 
(Haiti). The paper was actually first issued in July 2006 for the International 
Conference on Economic and Social Development, which was held in Haiti. 
Though the document comprehensively reviewed the poverty and underde-
velopment in Haiti, only its justice sector reforms are discussed here. 
 39. Haiti: Failed Justice?, supra note 33, at 77. 
 40. Id. at 77–79. 
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A principal target of the justice sector reform, as set forth in 
the Strategy Paper, was the modernization of legislation 
through the adoption of specific and targeted changes in the 
Penal Code and the Criminal Procedures Code.41 This mandate 
posed the question of whether the present system should be 
reformed or whether it should be discarded in favor of a com-
plete transition to the accusatorial model. States in transition 
commonly deal with this question, as each country seeks to 
minimize the trauma to the established legal order. Several 
international non-governmental organizations have attempted 
small reforms in Haiti. “Judicial strengthening” is a typical re-
form that sends many of the legal players to a variety of train-
ing seminars but seldom results in any basic changes.42 This is 
not to say that many judges, prosecutors, and police have not 
benefited from the training exercises. However, very few of the 
training sessions have convinced the majority of people that 
anything has changed or that the legal system is any more con-
scious of due process or human rights than it ever was. It was 
therefore determined that a group of changes embracing both 
the accusatorial and inquisitorial systems should be attempted. 
III. THE HAITI LAW REFORM PROJECT  
In 2009, René Magloire, chair of the Commissions to reform 
the Criminal Law and Procedure Codes, invited the author to 
serve as Senior Advisor to the Commissions to aid in the draft-
ing, codification, and implementation processes. As a French 
speaker experienced in preparing lawyers and judges for the 
transition from the inquisitorial to the accusatorial model,43 the 
author traveled to Haiti in May 2009. The two Commissions 
were comprised of the principal players in the reform process, 
including the dean of the largest law school, the vice-president 
of the highest court (“Cour de cassation”), the Minister of Jus-
tice, and the head of the Justice Section of MINUSTAH,44 the 
much-criticized U.N. peacekeeping force in Haiti. 
                                                                                                                                  
 41. Id. at 80. 
 42. Stotzky, The Indispensable State, supra note 25, at 242. 
 43. For a full exposition see Cavise, supra note 14, at 787–93. 
 44. Facts and Figures, UNITED NATIONS STABILISATION MISSION IN HAITI 
[MINUSTAH], www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/facts.shtml. 
For a recitation of some of the more common criticisms of MINUSTAH, see 
HEALTHROOTS STUDENT ORG., HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, MINUSTAH: 
KEEPING THE PEACE, OR CONSPIRING AGAINST IT?: A REVIEW OF THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS RECORD OF THE UNITED NATIONS STABILIZATION MISSION IN HAITI 1 
(Oct. 2011), available at 
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The establishment of two separate Commissions, for the sub-
stantive criminal law and another for the criminal procedure 
law, may have been unnecessary. The procedural transfor-
mation is a more complex and controversial undertaking, alt-
hough the substantive criminal Code does require some mod-
ernization and integration. However, the Haitian criminal 
Code has adapted somewhat to the modern era by codifying 
new crimes.45 Procedural transition, on the other hand, would 
have a more dramatic societal impact. The Commissions, com-
posed of lawyers, criminologists, and sociologists, were particu-
larly well-situated to avoid the political turf questions that 
have plagued other transitions from the inquisitorial to the ac-
cusatorial system. No member of either Commission held polit-
ical or governmental office. Nonetheless, the power of the 
Commissions was unquestioned due to the presidential man-
date and Magloire’s status not only as a former and very well 
known Minister of Justice, but also as a close advisor to Presi-
dent Préval. 
Magloire intended to plan for an international workshop on 
Haiti’s transition in Port-au-Prince in June 2009, a month after 
the author’s initial visit. The workshop would unveil the reform 
project and act as an initial exposition of the accusatorial mod-
el of criminal law. Magloire had planned for several prominent 
protagonists, whether Haitian or foreign lawyers, to demon-
strate the advantages of the party model. The Commissions 
                                                                                                                                  
http://www.tanbou.com/2011/fall/MINUSTAHWhitePaper.pdf. More recently, 
MINUSTAH and the U.N. have been blamed by some for the introduction of 
cholera into Haiti which, to date, has resulted in the deaths of over 7000 Hai-
tians. Nepalese soldiers working for the U.N. peacekeepers were allegedly 
contaminated upon their arrival in Haiti and, thereafter, there were inade-
quate sanitation facilities in their encampment. Jane Chong & Muneer I. 
Ahmad, YaleOpEd: Haiti, Cholera and the U.N., MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 30, 
2012), available at http://www.ijdh.org/yale-oped-haiti-cholera-and-the-u-n-
by-miami-herald/#.UWBFHJOG2So. Lawyers for the Institute for Justice and 
Democracy in Haiti have filed petitions with the U.N. organizations seeking 
damages. See Matthew Mosk & Rym Momtaz, Report: UN Peacekeepers 
Caused Cholera Epidemic in Haiti, ABC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2011) available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/report-caused-cholera-
haiti/story?id=14904474#.UWBnoZOG2Sr. 
 45. ALBRECHT, AUCOIN & O’CONNOR, supra note 8, at 2–4. Another prob-
lem, however, is that many unmodified portions of the criminal law are un-
clear or completely outdated. 
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hoped to convince the attendees that joining the reform move-
ment, already underway in many Latin American countries, 
would serve Haiti best. The Commissions also hoped that the 
June conference would unite all the interested national and 
international parties around addressing several key questions: 
(1) the jurisprudential underpinnings of the Code reforms, (2) 
the substance of various actual Code provisions, (3) the process 
of reform of the Codes, and (4) the implementation issues to 
expect. 
Planning also focused on anticipated obstacles to reform, in-
cluding jurists who may be hesitant to adopt the accusatorial 
model or who may prefer small-scale modifications to “Grand 
Reform.” This has never been an easy question to resolve. The 
United States, which is the principal employer of the party 
model, has a number of very strong cultural differences with all 
of the countries transitioning, and a widely-displayed number 
of criminal procedure structures that have, in practice, col-
lapsed into virtual dysfunction. The American plea bargaining 
system, always viewed with suspicion internationally as akin 
to a business negotiation, is all the more unattractive when it 
is learned that fully 95% of all federal criminal dispositions are 
by guilty plea,46 that people are allowed to plead guilty even 
though they maintain their innocence,47 and that defendants 
can be threatened with increased charges if they refuse to 
plead guilty.48 Internationally, including in Haiti, the perva-
siveness and perceived unfairness of the guilty plea in the 
American system is seen as a systemic expedient rather than a 
proper resolution of a criminal case based upon guilt or inno-
cence. 
One important cultural difference is the jury. Most Latin 
countries have rejected the jury as the arbiter of the facts for a 
variety of reasons.49 The lack of a jury tradition is probably the 
principal reason for hesitation but an underlying bias is the 
                                                                                                                                  
 46. Frye v. Missouri, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407–08 (2012). 
 47. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 29–30 (1970). 
 48. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 
 49. There are exceptions. Argentina, for example, tries most felony cases 
before a mixed panel composed of judges and laypersons. LUCIANO A. HAZAN Y 
ALAN IUD, CEJA, INFORME DE EVALUACIÓN DEL PROCESO DE FORTALECIMIENTO 
DEL SISTEMA ACUSATORIO EN LA PROVINCIA DE BUENOS AIRES – PLAN DE 
FLAGRANCIA [ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE STRENGTHENING PROCESS OF THE 
ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM IN THE PROVINCE OF BUENOS AIRES – PLAN FRAGRANCY] 
(2008); see also Edmundo Hendler, Lay Participation in Argentina: Old Histo-
ry, Recent Experience, 15 SW. J. INT’L L. 1, 13–14 (2008–2009).  
2013] LEGAL REFORM IN HAITI 893 
 
often-encountered feeling that the citizen of Latin countries or 
Haiti are simply unprepared to assume the responsibilities of 
being a juror: to impartially receive, understand, and review 
the evidence and to pronounce a verdict, even if that verdict is 
against the prosecutor and the police who represent the gov-
ernment. The history of repression in many of these countries 
has been so strong that the average citizen will still hesitate to 
contradict the wishes of the representatives of the government. 
On a more philosophical plane, there is resistance to the con-
frontational and, as perceived, overly adversarial nature of the 
accusatorial common-law system. A basic trust in the truth-
seeking ability of the single judge survives even in countries 
where abuses abound.50 When the advocates prepare the trial, 
compiling proof (a more quantitative goal) is seen as more im-
portant than the evaluation of that proof (the qualitative goal). 
Freiberg points out that, too often in the adversarial system, 
cases are presented to courts as “disputes” and trials are re-
garded as contests of opposing interests—confrontational and 
antagonistic. The emphasis is not on finding the truth but ra-
ther on destroying the other side’s version.51 Defense attorneys 
instruct their clients to “deny everything” and make the prose-
cution prove its case rather than to accept responsibility where 
appropriate and perhaps even show contrition. This domination 
of the system by a sense of adversarialism has led several 
countries to seek out alternative dispute resolution models that 
encompass some degree of compromise, mediation, and ac-
ceptance of responsibility. This is particularly true in countries 
where the state apparatus has very high legitimacy and trust-
worthiness, such as in the Nordic countries.52 
For reasons such as this, a number of European and Latin 
countries have opted for what they call a “mixed” or “hybrid” 
system, which normally lies somewhere between the inquisito-
rial and the accusatorial models.53 It is virtually impossible and 
                                                                                                                                  
 50. Arie Freiberg, Post-Adversarial and Post-Inquisitorial Justice: Trans-
cending Traditional Penological Paradigms, 8 EUR. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 82, 83–
84 (2011). 
 51. Id. at 84. 
 52. Id. at 85. 
 53. For a cataloging of differences and similarities see DELMAS-MARTY & 
SPENCER, supra note 13, at 27–32. 
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indeed ill-advised to consider whether to adopt the “pure” or 
the “mixed” as a matter of principal. These reforms should be 
discussed one by one and, in most circumstances, results will 
be considered “hybrid” even if the country adopts the key con-
structs of the accusatorial model. Once a country decides to re-
tire the judge of instruction as the investigator, caller of wit-
nesses, evaluator of the evidence, and final judge, it has al-
ready prepared the way for the party model. Once the criminal 
case has been turned over to the parties for an oral and open 
hearing with live witnesses and cross-examination, the essence 
of the party system has been adopted. Transferring power from 
the judge to the prosecutor is an impactful reform, given that 
the prosecutor will control the investigating police, the charg-
ing decision, the investigation itself, and the state’s presenta-
tion of evidence. In the absence of a functioning criminal de-
fense bar, particularly for the overwhelming numbers of indi-
gent defendants, the balance of power between the parties will 
be tilted dramatically towards the prosecution, at least until 
public defender offices can be funded, and the attorneys 
trained. This transference of power from the judge to the prose-
cutor is obvious to the Haitian criminal lawyers and, as will be 
seen, results in serious doubts for some about the entire transi-
tion. 
The author’s task, at this early stage, was to outline the prin-
cipal points for discussion in both the plenary session and the 
small working groups at the June conference, focusing on the 
practical differences—such as the role of the prosecutor—in or-
der to draw out the philosophical differences. The field from 
which to propose questions, both practical and philosophical, is 
very rich. The accusatorial system differs dramatically from 
the inquisitorial system in well over twenty respects. Even if 
one is convinced that a transition should occur in the key ways 
previously mentioned, such as turning over the proceedings to 
counsel, conducting open and oral hearings, developing a 
strong defense, and changing the judge’s role to that of an arbi-
ter mainly of questions of law, it does not necessarily follow 
that each of the other ancillary changes often discussed should 
be adopted in all cases. Experiences in other countries have 
shown which parts of the transition would be the most difficult 
to accept, certainly at this early stage. Nonetheless, foreigners 
placed in the role of experts in the design and implementation 
of justice projects such as this one should proceed cautiously to 
avoid being impatient, judgmental, or over-bearing. Allegiance 
to the accusatorial system, particularly common among Ameri-
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cans, can lead to biases and assumptions that are unhelpful in 
this context. All too often, small groups of foreign experts have 
developed codes in consultation with a discreet number of gov-
ernment officials, but virtually no consultation with the re-
mainder of the bar or other parts of civil society.54 Fortunately, 
Magloire was also very sensitive to that problem. After much 
discussion, it was determined that the working groups at the 
first conference should concentrate on the following issues: 
1) Whether to maintain the juge d’instruction or to adopt 
President Sarkozy’s formulation of the juge de l’instruction, 
which, despite seeming to be almost exactly the same appella-
tion, provides for a judiciary more akin to that of the party 
system, a referee between the parties as they present evi-
dence; 
2) Whether to give the prosecutor control of the judicial police; 
3) Whether to implement the concept of l’egalité d’armes, 
which contemplates a considerable expansion of the role of 
the defense counsel to bring the defense into an equal position 
with the prosecution, at least at trial, and; 
4) How to set and enforce time limits in regards to the rights 
to a speedy trial, and to be free from unnecessary preventive 
detention.55 
If time permitted, the working groups would also consider the 
role of the victim,56 training and jurisdiction of justices of the 
peace, oral presentation of evidence in general,57 and plea bar-
gaining.58 This list of topics did not touch upon many smaller 
                                                                                                                                  
 54. Luis Salas, From Law and Development to Rule of Law: New and Old 
Issues in Justice Reform in Latin America, in RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: 
THE INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION OF JUDICIAL REFORM 45 (2001). 
 55. Conference notes on file with author. 
 56. In most traditional European systems, the victim is a full party to the 
proceeding, with rights to call witnesses, argue, contest legal rulings, and 
appeal. See infra text accompanying notes 78–80. 
 57. One of the major hesitations about oral witness examination is the 
suggestiveness and aggressiveness of cross-examination. See Cavise, supra 
note 14, at 804–05. 
 58. Transition countries have developed a variety of ways of adopting some 
form of plea bargaining without opting into the purely American model. The 
widely held perception is that, in the United States, some defendants will 
plead guilty without actually being guilty because of the pressure brought to 
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sub-issues, including the principle of opportunité,59 various 
burdens of proof, whether the invocation of the right to silence 
can give rise to negative inferences, and reform of law school 
curricula and teaching methods. Again, the field from which to 
draw is infinite. 
Most of the roadblocks to a wholesale reformation of the crim-
inal justice system encountered at the conference were entirely 
foreseeable. Primarily, and always a concern in Haiti, the prob-
lem of financing the transition. How can Haitians persuade 
foreign donors to finance the law reform project when Haiti has 
so many other “survival” issues to face? That question remains 
unanswered today. How, and in which jurisdiction, to conduct 
training is another major concern.60 This question brings into 
play the predictable turf issues, which also remain largely un-
decided. How can the reformers educate the public to boost 
popular confidence in the justice system? How can this project 
be coordinated with prison reform and judicial administration 
initiatives? The questions are numerous, but one formidable 
but unspoken obstacle was the resistance of the French and the 
Francophiles to the transition. 
IV. THE HISTORY OF FRANCO-HAITIAN RELATIONS 
A very short look at historical Franco-Haitian relations may 
be useful. The French have, of course, the longest history in 
Haiti. French rule began in 1660 after the Spanish decided to 
concentrate on what has become the Dominican Republic. The 
Spanish formally ceded the western half of the island to the 
French in 1697.61 By the 1780s, the French colony of Saint 
                                                                                                                                  
bear by the prosecutors. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 29–
30 (1970). The Italians, for example, have adopted the “summary trial” 
which, in most respects, resembles a plea bargain. See Marafioti, supra note 
16, at 90. 
 59. Opportunité refers to the right of the prosecutor to dismiss a criminal 
charge without prior consultation with the presiding judge. 
 60. In the wake of the earthquake, non-governmental organizations 
(“NGOs”) have been very reluctant to turn over dedicated funds to Haitian 
government without assurances of when and how the funds will be spent. See 
Jake Johnston, Op-Ed., Humanitarian Aid in Haiti: Supply and Demand, 
CARIBBEAN J. (Dec. 23, 2011, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.caribjournal.com/2011/12/23/op-ed-jake-johnston-on-
humanitarian-aid-in-haiti-supply-and-demand/. 
 61. Jalisco Lancer, The Conflict Between Haiti and the Dominican Repub-
lic, ALL EMPIRES, 
http://www.allempires.com/article/index.php?q=conflict_haiti_dominican (last 
visited May 12, 2013). 
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Domingue, from which Haiti emerged, had become a major 
producer of coffee and sugar.62 The French imported 790,000 
slaves, far more than any other country in the Americas, in-
cluding the United States, to do the labor. The French also 
killed their slaves at the highest rates through generally in-
humane treatment.63 The revolt of the slaves began in 1791 
and culminated in a full-scale invasion by the armies of Napo-
leon in 1802. The French suffered enormous losses, and the 
former slaves made a final declaration of independence in 
1804.64 The French immediately imposed a trade embargo, 
which was not lifted until France recognized the independent 
republic in 1825 in exchange for a ransom payment of 150 mil-
lion gold Francs.65 
In 1915, Haiti was occupied by U.S. marines sent to protect 
U.S. and French interests. The military occupation lasted until 
1934 and, thereafter, the United States and France together 
supported a considerable number of ruling juntas66 and dicta-
torships in Haiti.67 In 1986, France granted asylum to Haitian 
dictator Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier. With the election of 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1994, and his reelection in 2000, the 
people of Haiti indeed had found a popular hero in whom they 
were convinced democratic ideals resided. Aristide, however, 
was not at all trusted by foreign interests.68 The United States 
and France installed World Bank official Gerard Latortue as 
prime minister after a 2004 military coup that overthrew Aris-
tide.69 A continuing issue, reiterated by Aristide in 2003, is 
Haiti’s demand for $21 billion as restitution for the ransom 
                                                                                                                                  
 62. Irwin Stotzky, The Truth about Haiti, 26 CONN. J. INT’L. L. 1, 17–18 
(2010). 
 63. Id. at 18. 
 64. Id. at 17, 25. 
 65. Id. at 18. 
 66. The term “junta” usually refers to a form of non-democratic governance 
of a country. Whether it be a military or civilian junta, it usually means gov-
ernance by a small committee, often leading to dictatorship. 
 67. Stotzky, The Truth about Haiti, supra note 62, at 23–24. 
 68. See id. at 26–27. 
 69. Aristide Denies Ties to Violence in Haiti and Calls for Dialogue, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 21, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/21/international/americas/21haiti.html?ref=
gerardlatortue. 
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paid to the French for independence.70 It is plain, however, 
that, at some point in the latter part of the last century, the 
United States took the lead in managing Haiti’s relations with 
the rest of the world. Nonetheless, Haitians continue to see 
France as a main culprit in the destruction of Haitian democ-
racy. Additionally, France contributes far less foreign aid to 
Haiti than Canada, the United States, and the Nordic coun-
tries, despite its historical legacy, commonality of language, 
and institutional development, including the legal system.71 
Despite the lack of the kind of post-colonial foreign aid that is 
typical of the “mother country,” France maintains a strong 
presence in Haiti and continues to play a role in the nation’s 
affairs. In that context, it is not surprising the French would 
have strong opinions about the idea of Haiti transforming its 
criminal justice system away from the French inquisitorial 
model toward the American model. Beyond a certain national 
chauvinism in defense of the French-founded civil code system, 
many French critics think of the transition and its logistical 
burden as too costly for such a poor and undeveloped country. 
They also see the reforms as too difficult to implement for the 
Haitian people, most of whom are unschooled and illiterate. 
Indeed, it is undeniable that the maintenance of one juge 
d’instruction is certainly less expensive than the party model. 
However, those financial savings come at the cost of many fun-
damental rights that Haitians are entitled to enjoy just as 
much as any other people. This particular manifestation of 
“Haitian exceptionalism” must also play a role in the French 
perspective that any criminal procedure reforms should pro-
ceed slowly, even though so many of the Latin countries that 
have begun the transition are, themselves, very poor and un-
derdeveloped. Finally, it should not go unnoticed that French 
critics may be particularly forthright when the question is seen 
as whether to adopt yet another American way of doing things. 
                                                                                                                                  
 70. See Interview by Radio Solidarity with Joseph Philippe Antonio, Hai-
tian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Port-au-Prince, Haiti (Apr. 10, 2003), 
available at http://www.haitiaction.net/News/Rest3.html. 
 71. See Haiti Earthquake Aid Pledged by Country, GUARDIAN (Jan. 14, 
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/jan/14/haiti-quake-aid-
pledges-country-donations#data; Patricia A. Reid, The Haitian Revolution, 
Black Petitioners and Refugee Widows in Maryland, 1796-1820, 50 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 431, 438 n.25 (2010) (“The entire Haitian legal system is that of 
France of the early 19th century.”). 
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V. THE FIRST LAW REFORM CONFERENCE: A CLASH OF VIEWS 
In June 2009, the conferences and workshops72 on the mod-
ernization of the Codes took place in Port-au-Prince. Besides 
the leading members of the Haitian bar and Haitian academics, 
a number of French representatives (including an appellate 
judge from Toulouse and a Supreme Court Justice from Sene-
gal), there were several independent foreign experts in attend-
ance. One of the “godfathers” of transition movements in Latin 
America, the Argentine Alberto Binder,73 made valuable con-
tributions, along with a number of jurists from the Dominican 
Republic whose experience is seen by many as a model for Hai-
tian legal development. Several American government funding 
agency officials were also present. The foreign presence also 
included representatives from the U.N. Mission in Haiti 
(“MINUSTAH”), the United States Agency for International 
Development (“USAID”), the International Legal Assistance 
Consortium, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the Organization 
of American States. 
The purpose of this first conference was to expose the princi-
pal Haitian actors to the importance of this transition and to 
the experiences of other countries in Latin America that had 
attempted to implement the accusatorial system. As anticipat-
ed, discussion over the two days centered on several key ques-
tions.74 
The first major discussion topic had to be, of necessity, the 
question of the suppression or maintenance of the juge 
d’instruction. Even those seeking to maintain the status quo 
were, for the most part, willing to admit that adjustments had 
to be made. For example, the accused should be given a lawyer 
                                                                                                                                  
 72. L’Atelier sur la Modernisation du Code Pénal et du Code d’Instruction 
Criminelle [Workshop on the Modernization of the Penal and Criminal Pro-
cedure Codes], June 9–10, 2009, Port-au-Prince, Haiti (agenda and materials 
on file with author); see ALBRECHT, AUCOIN & O’CONNOR, supra note 8 at 1, 5. 
 73. Dr. Alberto Binder, Professor in Procedural Rights and the University 
of Buenos Aires, is also the Director of the Public Policy Center for Socialism 
(“CEPPAS”), Director of the Latin American Institute for Security and De-
mocracy (“ILSED”), and Co-Director of the review “Judicial Systems,” pub-
lished by the CEJA. 
 74. Commentary about this conference is drawn largely from the only for-
mal minutes taken (“Rapport de synthèse”) as well as some of the author’s 
notes and impressions. 
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who has access to the file and the right to contradict and cross-
examine; the police should be subjected to examination or in-
terrogatories by the judge during the investigation phase. A 
separate judge should be charged with making the preventive 
detention or bail decision; the juge d’instruction must be more 
respectful of individual liberties and the problem of pretrial de-
lay. There is also the possibility of creating a panel of three 
persons to oversee complex cases such as those of organized 
crime. Defendants should be granted the right to appeal from 
the results of the judge’s investigation. Those favoring the elim-
ination of the present juge d’instruction, fell into two camps: 
those who would follow the standard transition course and 
transfer the judge’s investigating power to the prosecutor, and 
those who would create a restyled juge d’instruction with much 
more defined powers, including preservation of the judge’s su-
pervision of the investigation. 
It is impossible to discuss reforming the role of the trial judge 
without discussing strengthening the role of the prosecutor un-
der the new Code. The reaction of the Haitian bar to this trans-
fer of power from the former investigating judge to the public 
prosecutor has been typically circumspect. Those who tend to 
trust prosecutors are in agreement with the proposed changes. 
Those who prefer the watchful eye of a supposedly impartial 
investigating judge resist the transfer. Particularly when it is 
understood that the prosecutor would also control the investi-
gating police, and basically displace the trial judge from any 
investigatory or supervisory role, the dramatic nature of this 
transformation becomes even more pronounced. 
In a country such as Haiti, where neither prosecutors nor 
judges are well paid and both are subject to corrupting influ-
ences, there is no reason to assume that the processes em-
ployed by the prosecutor will be any more transparent than 
those of the traditionally secretive juge d’instruction. It should 
be of some consolation, however, that, optimistically, there 
would be a functioning defense bar, which could operate as a 
check on the power of the prosecutor. When a prosecutor vio-
lates a provision of the Code or when, for example, a prosecutor 
forces the police to conduct a one-sided investigation, the bene-
fit of the adversarial system is that the defense counsel could 
then bring a motion before the sitting trial judge seeking relief. 
If, as is usually provided, the defense has access to discovery 
while the case is progressing towards trial, it may come to the 
defense counsel’s attention that the prosecutor is engaging in 
misconduct, allowing the defense to pursue appropriate relief 
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before the judge. This check on the prosecutor’s power can only 
be realized when there is a functioning criminal defense bar in 
Haiti. The training of criminal defense lawyers, along with re-
training of all the principal players in the criminal justice sys-
tem, should be a main focus of the infrastructure reform.  
Some of the resistance to this aspect of the reform exists 
simply because the public prosecutor is today under the control 
of the executive branch and arguably subject to additional po-
litical influences. The fear expressed was that a subservient 
prosecutor’s office would become a jurisdiction unto itself with 
the power to both prosecute and judge. On the other hand, the 
new Code provides that the office of the prosecutor shall be in-
dependent and that there is a clear separation of powers be-
tween the executive and the judiciary. These provisions, if 
complemented by the necessary increase in material and hu-
man resources, are seen as a possible path to a stand-alone 
prosecutor’s office. Some safeguarding suggestions included a 
precise hierarchy in the office of the public prosecutor with 
clear lines of authority, creation of a civil remedy for those vic-
timized by prosecutorial abuse, judicial supervision over mal-
feasance in the office, and, of course, strengthening the defense 
function as part of the equal power or “egalité d’armes.” Even 
those who are the most supportive of the juge d’instruction had 
to agree with the absolute necessity of prescribing time limita-
tions for the various stages of the process to avoid the same in-
terminable delays in the prosecutor’s office as have traditional-
ly been seen with the juge d’instruction.   
Discussion over whether or not the prosecution should have 
the power to dismiss unilaterally (the principle of opportunité) 
a charge is generally controversial, particularly in countries 
like Haiti, where corruption is a severe problem. In some tran-
sition countries, such as Italy, the judge must approve a dis-
missal whereas in France, for example, the prosecutor has the 
sole power to do so.75 Once again, the view is that unbridled 
power vested in the prosecutor can lead to corruption or influ-
ence peddling. Several provisions of the present criminal 
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Code76 and several decisions of the Cour de cassation have not 
given the prosecutor that right.77 Nonetheless, the right to 
dismiss generally was supported since it would result in a re-
duction in the number of docket cases and the number of per-
sons being held without trial. The decision to dismiss a previ-
ously filed case must, however, be on the record, with notifica-
tion to the victim. A discussion was also had about a third path 
between prosecution and dismissal—alternative dispute resolu-
tion. 
Another important question was the role of the victim in the 
criminal process, as the right of participation of the victim 
(“partie civile”) is another transitional sticking point. In inquis-
itorial systems, the victim is ordinarily much more included as 
a full third party to the criminal process.78 The victim, with or 
without counsel (provided the victim qualifies for free court-
appointed counsel), presently has the right to appeal a judg-
ment, to present argument, and to fully share in the, albeit lim-
ited, role enjoyed by the parties in the inquisitorial system.79 In 
the Haitian draft code, the victim, defined as a person who has 
“personally and directly suffered damage” as a result of the 
crime, even has the right to contest before the trial judge a 
prosecutor’s decision to deny him or her designation as partie 
civile. In the accusatorial model, the victim loses that third 
party role. The prosecutor, at least in the American model, is 
charged with protecting the participation of the victim. This 
ordinarily means that the victim, who is often the complaining 
witness, can be a witness at a preliminary hearing, motion, or 
trial if called by the prosecutor and can testify, with re-
strictions, during sentencing.80 Beyond that, the American sys-
tem, at least, allows the victim to proceed civilly for money 
damages or other appropriate relief, but in a separate cause of 
action. 
The prospect of a drastically reduced role for the victim in the 
adversarial system was not well received in Haiti, just as it has 
                                                                                                                                  
 76. See CODE D’INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE [C.I.C.] arts. 37, 42, 51 (Haiti), 
translated in GENDARMERIE TRANSLATION OF THE CODE PÉNAL AND THE CODE 
D’INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE 8–12 (1922). 
 77. In French civil parlance, the right to dismiss is referred to as système 
d’opportunité. 
 78. See Freiberg, supra note 50, at 92–93. 
 79. See Carlos Rios Espinoza, Redesigning Mexico’s Criminal Procedure: 
The States’ Turning Point, 15 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 53, 70 (2008). 
 80. Reference here is made to the victim impact statements approved by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824–30 (1991). 
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not been well received in other transition states, particularly 
those where victims seldom actually bring civil suits and look 
to the criminal trial for damages.81 Even when presented with, 
if nothing else, the logistical difficulties of three-party trials, 
including three opening statements, three closing arguments, 
three direct examinations, three cross-examinations, and three 
sets of exhibits and motions, it was never seriously doubted 
that the new Code would continue to recognize the victim’s 
rights as in the old Code. Those rights, as the draft law is pres-
ently written, would also include the presentation, by the vic-
tim, of third-party witnesses such as experts. The rights of the 
victim would also include, in the new Code, perhaps the most 
obstructing provision of all: the victim’s right to contest a pros-
ecutor’s decision to drop a case.82 The importance of allowing a 
prosecutor to drop criminal charges that should not be in the 
system or cannot be proven is difficult to overestimate when 
considering the enormous backlog of cases. Should victims be 
allowed to contest that decision through court proceedings that 
can do nothing but frustrate the intent to relieve the congested 
dockets, Haiti will continue to face the possibility of protracted 
proceedings in potentially every case. 
Analyzing the reluctance to transition to a more common-law 
version of the role of the victim is not difficult when one under-
stands the importance, in Haiti, of public acceptance of this en-
tire transition. To tell victims that they would have a much 
more limited role would undoubtedly provoke a feeling of not 
having been heard or not having had a day in court, and could 
therefore diminish the public confidence essential to the suc-
cess of the system even before implementation. 
There seemed to be consensus that a partie civile could only 
be a physical person and could not be a business or corporation, 
personne morale. There also seemed to be a consensus that the 
role of the victim should remain unchanged from that presently 
existing under Haitian law, meaning that the victim can assert 
his or her rights at all phases of the criminal process, including 
the right, as discussed, to petition the judiciary when the pros-
                                                                                                                                  
 81. See, e.g., CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P.] arts. 74, 75 (It.). Under 
these provisions, civil actions are joined to the criminal proceeding. Id. 
 82. See discussion of the prosecutor’s right of opportunité supra notes 59, 
75–77 and accompanying text. 
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ecutor refuses to prosecute. Some advocated that “associations” 
could also be treated as parties civiles. Finally, to help alleviate 
the concern that victims would be shut out of the process, there 
was also support for the idea that victims of unsolved crimes 
should receive indemnification from a public fund.83 
The question of preventive detention self-divided into two 
sub-issues: la garde a vue, referring generally to the period of 
time officials can detain a suspect for purposes of investigation 
without presentment to a judge,84 and the more internationally 
standardized concept of preventive or pretrial detention. La 
garde a vue not only had its supporters at the Haitian confer-
ence, but a number of jurists felt that the traditional limit of 
forty-eight hours of detention was unrealistically short given 
the problems of communication, distance, and transportation. 
In serious cases, an indefinite garde a vue under judicial su-
pervision was proposed. Others, perhaps in the majority, felt 
that the forty-eight-hour limitation was a constitutional guar-
antee of individual rights and liberties that must not be 
touched. As to preventive detention, referring to all detention 
prior to judgment, the conference reinforced the idea that liber-
ty is the rule, that detention should be the exception, and that 
any judicial decision to hold a suspect would have to not only 
conform to the speedy trial provisions of the Code, but must 
also be the subject of a decision on the record by the judicial 
officer. Any prolonged detention would have to be justified on 
the record, with a right to appeal the detention, and to be re-
leased when the limits were surpassed. The conference also re-
confirmed the availability of the writ of habeas corpus to con-
test detention.85 
Another important question was the nature of proceedings in 
minor criminal cases or “contraventions.” In Haiti, justices of 
the peace, most of whom are not lawyers, typically preside over 
these proceedings. They also serve a double function (“double 
casquette”) as judicial police, meaning that they investigate the 
cases over which they will later preside. In the inquisitorial 
system, that is the classic dynamic. In the party system, how-
ever, the double casquette is a source of confusion and dysfunc-
                                                                                                                                  
 83. Conference notes and materials on file with author. 
 84. For a discussion of Mireille Delmas-Marty’s comments before the 
French Senate on the garde vue, see Audition de Mme. Mireille Delmas-
Marty, Professeur À L’Université de Paris I, Responsible de la Commission 
“Justice Pénale et Droits de l’Homme” en 1988–1990, BIENVENUE AU SÉNAT, 
available at http://www.senat.fr/rap/l99-283/l99-28325.html. 
 85. Conference notes and materials on file with author. 
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tion in the procedural chain. Most participants wished to end 
the double function and return investigation to the judicial po-
lice. A minority felt that a police investigation conducted by a 
justice of the peace normally inspired more confidence in the 
results. 
A more controversial issue was who should be the fact-finder 
at trial. Even though the present Haitian Constitution calls for 
jury trials in certain cases,86 there was, in the drafting process, 
very little support for the adoption of criminal jury trials. The 
objections were typical in that the participating Haitian law-
yers did not feel that their fellow citizens were “qualified” to 
apply the law to the facts of a case. This has generally been the 
reaction in most transitioning Latin American countries.87 The 
idea that a decision by a jury could be seen as more legitimate 
because it comes from the people themselves does not yet have 
traction in Haiti. Several alternative proposals were made. 
Some reformers were content to stay with one judge, while oth-
ers preferred a panel of three persons including at least one 
judge. Not only were very few participants in favor of the 
American model of the six or twelve-person jury, but few were 
willing to support even the maintenance of the present Haitian 
Constitutional provision.88 If there was a consensus point, it 
would have been around the three-person panel, as proposed 
and reserved for felony-type cases, while the single judge would 
oversee minor crimes. Some felt that panels of judges are simp-
ly unrealistic, given the lack of resources and the high costs of 
training. Almost all participants agreed, however, on the idea 
of judge specializations (“chambres specialisées”) where judges 
                                                                                                                                  
 86. Article 50 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of Haiti calls for 
jury trials in “crimes de sang” or “blood felonies.” CONST. of 1987 art. 50 (Hai-
ti). Commentators say, however, that there have been no jury trials for sev-
eral years. INT’L CRISIS GROUP, HAITI: JUSTICE REFORM AND THE SECURITY 
CRISIS 3 (2007) [hereinafter SECURITY CRISIS]. 
 87. See Cavise, supra note 14, at 803–04. For an example of one of the few 
codes that has introduced a jury system, see CÓDIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL 
[C.P.P.] art. X (Bol.) (enacted on March 25, 1999, as Law No. 1970). On the 
other hand, Brazil has had a jury system since 1822. In that country, a group 
of seven jurors is selected from a group of twenty-one as the “Jury Council.” 
Edmundo Hendler, Lay Participation in Argentina: Old History, Recent Expe-
rience, 15 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1, 4–5 (2008). 
 88. CONST. of 1987 art. 50 (Haiti). 
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with particular training would preside over certain types of 
cases. 
Internationally, in those criminal court systems where there 
is no jury, the rules of evidence and discovery are not highly 
developed. Theoretically, the judge does not need to be protect-
ed from the introduction of prejudicial evidence such as im-
proper character evidence or hearsay. Often, particular code 
provisions are adopted to reflect evidentiary concerns, rather 
than embarking on the more complex process of elaborating 
rules of evidence or discovery. Some participants at the Haitian 
conference were in favor of the adoption of a code of evidence to 
control the admissibility or nonadmissibility of physical or ma-
terial proof, the accessibility of all proof to both sides, and the 
availability of experts and technical or scientific proof. Others 
felt that particular Code provisions would be sufficient. The 
question was left unresolved. 
Another key procedural mechanism of the accusatorial sys-
tem that has received a mixed reaction in Haiti is plea bargain-
ing. In the inquisitorial system, guilty pleas ordinarily are not 
admitted since the investigating judge decides guilt or inno-
cence. However, most civil systems have found a way to ac-
commodate some degree of plea negotiation to adapt to rising 
crime rates and limited judicial resources.89 The hesitation is 
due to the philosophical difficulties inquisitorial countries have 
had with the idea that justice would depend on a negotiation, 
sometimes regardless of actual guilt or innocence.90 The Hai-
tian reaction to plea bargaining proposals was typical of civil 
law countries. Lawyers are very hesitant both to see culpability 
as an object of deal-making and to give prosecutors and defense 
lawyers, independent of the judge, the authority to arrive at a 
negotiated disposition. To include a provision that the judge 
must approve the plea bargain is often of little consolation. 
What most transitioning countries fail to appreciate is that 
plea bargaining can relieve much of the stress on the criminal 
justice system and that a large percentage of cases can be dis-
posed of through equitable and reasonable negotiation. Unfor-
tunately, Haitians have seen the results of the plea bargaining 
system in the United States where fully 97% of all criminal 
cases in the federal system and 94% of all state cases are dis-
posed of by guilty pleas,91 rendering most of the previously 
                                                                                                                                  
 89. See, e.g., Marafioti, supra note 16, at 90. 
 90. KEEPING HAITI SAFE, supra note 9, at 11. 
 91. Frye v. Missouri, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). 
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cherished trial rights largely illusory. They have also come to 
understand that the desperately overcrowded American crimi-
nal system has led to Supreme Court sanctioning of what could 
be considered distortions of plea bargaining, such as North 
Carolina v. Alford92 or Bordenkircher v. Hayes.93 It is one thing 
to encourage a country to adopt plea bargaining grosso modo, 
but to include the notion that one can plead guilty without ac-
tually being guilty,94 or that a prosecutor can threaten to and 
actually increase the charges on a defendant who refuses to 
plead guilty,95 would be to delegitimize the process as con-
sistent with basic human rights norms. 
Rather than sublimate human rights protections within other 
provisions of the new Code, it was determined that a human 
rights preamble should introduce it, partially to codify but also 
to make the statement that human rights is at the forefront of 
this reform. At the conclusion of the conference, the author was 
asked to draft the human rights preamble to the new criminal 
procedure Code. That work was undertaken immediately in full 
anticipation of another conference in a few months at which the 
discussion could be continued. 
On January 12, 2010, the earthquake struck Haiti, centering 
on a point just outside Port-au-Prince, the seat of government 
and home to all central government institutions. As many as 
300,000 people were killed, and even more were injured; 
208,000 residences were destroyed, along with 1300 education-
al institutions, and more than fifty hospitals and health cen-
ters.96 The National Palace, the Ministry of Justice, and the 
Supreme Court buildings were destroyed. Since the earth-
quake, institutions throughout Haiti have been in a state of 
disarray if not total dysfunction. As the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme noted: 
The earthquake destroyed almost all the Government’s infra-
structures (buildings, archives, technical and IT systems) and 
                                                                                                                                  
 92. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 29–30 (1970). 
 93. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 
 94. Alford, 400 U.S. at 39. 
 95. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364. 
 96. HAITI, ACTION PLAN, supra note 21, at 6–7. 
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severely affected its capacity to deliver the basic public and 
administrative services . . . .97 
Violence erupted almost everywhere. Looting, even grave-
robbing, massive prison escapes,98 and a complete absence of 
local authority throughout the affected region of the country 
worsened the situation.99 Women have suffered particularly in 
the aftermath in that sexual abuse, always prevalent in Hai-
tian society,100 became an epidemic in the tent cities.101 Key 
personnel in the criminal justice system, including various key 
officials in the Ministry of Justice and various members of the 
Cour de cassation, did not survive. There was also widespread 
loss of judicial files with the destruction of judicial buildings.102 
The capacity of the very diminished government to carry out 
large justice reforms seemed most implausible, especially in 
the face of widespread starvation, homelessness, and violence. 
With Port-au-Prince in chaos, without essential infrastruc-
ture such as electricity and clean water, and with food in short 
supply, it was fully expected that the law reform project would 
be put on hold indefinitely—at least until the basic needs of the 
population had been fulfilled. That was a mistaken assump-
tion. In the days after the earthquake, President René Préval 
summoned his surviving ministers to his base at the airport 
and the rule of law was again declared a priority for the gov-
                                                                                                                                  
 97. United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], Governance: Demo-
cratic Process and Public Administration Reform (March 2010), available at 
http://204.200.211.71/_assets/fichier/publication/CN_5_Governance.pdf. 
 98. By one estimate, some 4000 inmates escaped, most of whom had never 
been tried or convicted but were awaiting trial in a system that does not pro-
vide for bail. Ashby Jones, On Rebuilding the Haitian Criminal-Justice Sys-
tem: Where to Start?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan. 19, 2010, 11:33 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/01/19/on-rebuilding-the-haitian-criminal-
justice-system-where-to-start/ (quoting Gerald Shargel, Haiti’s Lawless 
Streets, DAILY BEAST (Jan 17, 2010 5:35 PM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/01/17/haitis-lawless-streets.html). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Benedetta Faedi, The Double Weakness of Girls: Discrimination and 
Sexual Violence in Haiti, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 147, 165 (2008). 
 101. The situation remains, at this writing, out of control, even in the face 
of the adoption, in July 2005, of a statute requiring that laws against rape be 
enforced. James D. Wilets & Camilo Espinosa, Rule of Law in Haiti Before 
and After the 2010 Earthquake, 6 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 181, 201 
(2011); Faedi, supra note 100, at 181–82 (discussing the Décret Modifiant le 
Régime des Agressions Sexuelles et Éliminant en la Matière les Discrimina-
tions Contre la Femme). 
 102. See also HAITI, ACTION PLAN, supra note 21, at 7. 
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ernment.103 The Minister of Justice contacted all Haitian 
courts, prosecutors, and police to request an assessment of 
damage and fatalities, along with an inventory of urgent needs. 
He also reactivated the Ministry of Justice in a series of ware-
houses near the destroyed Ministry.104 Amidst this chaos, bare-
ly three weeks after the earthquake, the third draft of the pro-
cedural Code began circulating and, within two months, anoth-
er conference was called.105 
VI. THE HUMAN RIGHTS PREAMBLE 
The best hope for democracy in Haiti ultimately lies in re-
spect for the human rights and autonomy of each individual. 
Most agree that there is parity between respect for individual 
human rights and the creation of a democracy.106 One cannot 
overstate the role that the legal system can play in the devel-
opment of human rights and therefore in the transition to de-
mocracy. This is particularly true in a country like Haiti that 
has suffered dictatorship, occupation, and privation for so long 
and has so little tradition of democracy.107 Nonetheless, the 
people of Haiti hunger for their human rights and have often 
risen in protest against an autocracy designed to oppress them. 
It is not enough to pass new codes. That kind of formal recog-
nition of rights has yet to yield practical results in Haiti. The 
supremacy of law remains unrecognized. The equality of per-
sons before the law is still only an aspiration. The accountabil-
ity of government officials is nonexistent. The accessibility of 
law is not a reality for most people. Efficiency, predictability, 
and transparency are unknown.108 A national discussion must 
be held among all those whose lives are affected by the criminal 
justice system. This discussion cannot be held while Haitians 
                                                                                                                                  
 103. VIVIENNE O’CONNOR, U.S. INST. OF PEACE [USIP], PEACE BRIEF 18: THE 
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 104. Id. 
 105. The reform of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, at this writing, in its 
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 106. Stotzky, The Truth about Haiti, supra note 62, at 27. 
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See UNDP, supra note 97. 
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are still living in tents at displacement camps. The discussion 
must be had hand-in-hand with recovery. 
It would be supremely progressive if Haiti were to develop a 
social consensus around universally recognized principles that 
guarantee the rights of the individual, including the right to 
participate in the democracy, to choose between competing in-
terests, and to have an equal voice in the popular debate.109 
The human rights aspect of a new criminal law and procedure 
is likely to be the part most noticed by a distrusting populace 
that was never exposed to a working legal system. Developing a 
social consensus might spark a new moral consciousness born 
of respect for the government and its laws, and of increased in-
tolerance for corruption, bias, and impunity.110 
At this point, the recognition of “the autonomous individual 
as a paradigm for democracy”111 by the public is practically im-
possible, given the institutional dysfunction, the disorganiza-
tion of political parties, and the lack of resources for public ed-
ucation. In anticipation of the country’s development of demo-
cratic institutions and the consolidation of the structural integ-
rity of the nation, the legal system must be ready. It must as-
sure the Haitian people that there can be justice in the country, 
that judges and legal officials do not have to be corrupt, and, 
most importantly, that any arrested person can look forward to 
more than languishing in a local jail without charges, without a 
lawyer, and without any defense. The legal system must afford 
the individual defendant the opportunity to contest the charges 
and to put the system to the test.112 
An important step in the process of the consolidation of the 
rule of law is the drafting of the fundamental human rights 
guarantees (“Principes Fondamentaux” or “Fundamental Prin-
ciples”). Haiti must adopt these and apply them to every crimi-
nal defendant. In the United States, most individual rights are 
                                                                                                                                  
 109. See Stotzky, The Indispensable State, supra note 25, at 217. 
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 111. Id. at 11. 
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encapsulated in the Bill of Rights and elaborated upon through 
case law. In Haiti, as today’s framers contemplated the draft-
ing of a new criminal procedure Code, it was determined that 
the code should be preceded by a formal declaration of those 
rights drawn from international guarantees, the preamble of 
the criminal procedure Code of the Dominican Republic, and 
from a sense of the Haitian needs. 
The human rights principles are intentionally brief to allow 
for the Code itself to be the more complete elaboration. Howev-
er, the preamble is significant in that it adopts basic human 
rights principles hitherto unspecified in Haitian law. The most 
important Fundamental Principles, beginning with Article 110 
of the eighth draft of the Code of Criminal Procedure are:113 
1. All persons are equal before the law and in court, and are 
subject to the same rules. The law must prohibit all discrimina-
tion, notably that of race, color, sex, language, religion, sexual 
preference, political opinion, national or social origin, or socio-
economic resources. 
2. The legality principle, which provides that no crime shall 
be charged unless, at the moment of commission, Haitian or 
international law to which Haiti is a signatory makes the act 
criminal, is codified. Where there is sufficient evidence that a 
crime has been committed, the prosecutor normally is required 
by law to prosecute.114 Punishment shall not be imposed, if it is 
not authorized in the applicable law at the time of commission. 
Laws shall be made retroactive only when they operate in favor 
of the accused. 
3. There is a presumption of innocence in the code’s pream-
ble. Haitians have the right to be silent without any inference 
of culpability, the right to be free from testifying against one-
self, the right to have the prosecution bear the burden of proof, 
the prohibition of press coverage that presumes the guilt of the 
accused, the right to be free from deprivation of pretrial liberty 
except in exceptional cases, and the right to judicial review. In 
addition, to deal with the complicated issues of the garde à 
                                                                                                                                  
 113. Conference notes and materials on file with author. 
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84. 
912 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:3 
vue,115 the Preamble also provides that Defendants shall be 
brought before a judge within forty-eight hours to determine 
pretrial release. 
4. The state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt 
(“au-dela de toute doute raisonnable.”). 
5. All suspected or prosecuted persons have the right to be in-
formed of the charges against them, the right to be assisted by 
a lawyer and, if necessary, an interpreter, and the right to be 
present at trial. The right to counsel includes counsel during 
police interrogations, the preliminary phase, and all phases of 
trial. For those who cannot afford counsel, one will be appoint-
ed free of charge. 
6. The function of investigation and judicial review shall be 
separate. 
7. The trial shall be held within a reasonable period of time. 
8. All evidence admitted before the court and entered into the 
record must have been obtained legally or must be rejected by 
the tribunal. 
9. Depositions and the trial until the pronouncement of 
judgment shall be conducted orally. 
10. Cross-examination is at the center of the criminal process. 
This means that the accused has the right to be physically pre-
sent at the trial and all other parts of the trial procedure, the 
right to dispute the evidence or indications of culpability, and 
the right to enter exculpatory evidence. 
11. There is a guaranteed right to appeal a conviction. This 
requires a written decision from the trial court as to both facts 
and law. 
12. Double jeopardy is prohibited, including a ban against a 
second prosecution even where the first prosecution was 
dropped or dismissed, unless new elements have been discov-
ered. 
13. Foreign judgments will be recognized in accordance with 
international treaties and conventions. The decision of an in-
ternational court recognized by Haiti could provoke a reopening 
of a previously disposed-of case. 
14. The right to an independent and impartial tribunal is 
guaranteed. 
15. There is also an explicit right to a fair and public trial. 
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VII. KEY FEATURES OF THE NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 
THAT DIFFER FROM THE ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEM 
Beyond the preamble, the Code as drafted includes a large 
number of other provisions characteristic of the accusatorial 
system. The most basic guarantees for the defendant, such as 
the right to defense counsel, the right to independently call 
witnesses, and the right to produce evidence, are all improve-
ments on the old system that was so reliant on the investigat-
ing judge. Those new rights are reflected throughout the Code. 
The Haitian decision to include a role for the victims remains 
a major variance with classical accusatorial procedure. Aside 
from granting the victim full party status, the Code also speci-
fies that victims will be treated with compassion, dignity, and 
respect, and that their interests will be taken into account at 
all stages, especially when the victim is a minor, a senior citi-
zen, physically or mentally handicapped, or a victim of sexual 
violence or other violations against women. The victim has a 
right to demand that an investigation be opened, and the right 
to present evidence. The government must consider those de-
mands. The victim shall also be notified of the progress of the 
case. Additionally, the trial tribunal can order that the victim 
be given access to the case file and the evidence, and ensure 
that the victim’s right to counsel and to present experts is not 
infringed. 
Another unorthodox set of provisions concerns the method of 
questioning witnesses. Counsel may ask questions and even 
make brief observations or commentary during the questioning 
of the defendant. First, the prosecution calls its witnesses, fol-
lowed by the defense and the victim, and, if necessary, the 
judge. Both the prosecution and the defense have the right to 
respond, implying that what is called a rebuttal case in the 
United States is afforded not only to the prosecution but also to 
the defense—not normally the case in the United States.116 All 
witnesses may be cross-examined and the judge may question 
witnesses if she wishes. Cross-examinations must be relevant 
either to the case or to the credibility of the witness. Witnesses 
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are first examined by direct examination, followed by cross-
examination, followed by redirect, as necessary. 
Conditions of pretrial release remain somewhat different. 
The new Code retains the old inquisitorial procedure of holding 
a recently arrested defendant in garde à vue for people where 
there is a “reasonable motive.”117 Those motives include the 
prevention of flight or destruction of evidence. The garde à vue 
is for twenty-four hours, but the chief prosecutor may authorize 
a twenty-four-hour extension. If the detainee has an attorney, 
that Mission de l’Administration Penitentiare attorney must be 
notified of the detention and may communicate in confidentiali-
ty with the detainee. There is also a specific right to have a 
family member notified of the detention. Aside from the obvi-
ous difference that there is no garde à vue in the American sys-
tem, there is also the fact that, for almost all crimes in the 
United States, a bond amount will be set which entitles the de-
fendant to pretrial release upon posting. The Haitian system, 
much like other transition states, does not adopt the bail-
setting procedures. After the garde à vue period has passed, the 
criminal defendant is either released or detained until trial, 
depending on a variety of factors including flight risk, danger 
to the community, and the seriousness of the charged offense. 
There is no provision for plea bargaining in the new Code. 
There are provisions concerning the right to plead guilty and 
the power of the judge to consider guilty pleas when passing a 
sentence, but there are no provisions granting the prosecutor 
the right to reduce or dismiss charges pursuant to guilty plea 
or the right to make an agreement with defense counsel as to 
sentencing, subject to the judge’s approval. The success of the 
new Code and the reformed system will depend largely on the 
acceptability of plea bargaining as a way of dislodging the over-
crowded courts in Haiti. 
VIII. KEY FEATURES OF THE NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 
THAT RESEMBLE THE ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEM 
Turning to those provisions that more evenly track the classi-
cal accusatorial procedure, a large number of provisions govern 
how the case is to be handled in the pretrial stage. Access to 
the case dossier is a key aspect of the reform in that the inter-
national concept of the egalité d’armes is meaningless if the 
files are unavailable to the defense. Under the proposed Code, 
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access is permitted whenever the court is open. Within five 
days, the chief prosecutor can ask the court to deny access in 
cases of possible pressure or intimidation of witnesses or vic-
tims. The decision to deny access is itself appealable. 
As to investigation, any of the parties, including the victim, 
can demand that the prosecutor conduct an interrogation, in-
vestigate a certain place, or make any other inquiry that is 
necessary to the investigation. The parties may also request 
certain tests by experts. In case of refusal, the parties may ap-
proach the judge of the preliminary or investigative stage. As 
to investigative techniques, the Code has very specific provi-
sions on the interception of communications, including tele-
communications, surveillance, personal mail, financial transac-
tions, and the like. 
The problem of cases lying dormant for many months or even 
several years was addressed. In cases where no investigation 
has been conducted for four months, the defendant can demand 
that the prosecution close the investigation. If the chief prose-
cutor does not move to close the investigation within one 
month, the defendant can petition the judge. 
The defendant must be immediately advised of his right to 
remain and that he has a right to a court-appointed lawyer if 
lacking sufficient funds to hire his own. These 
Miranda-type warnings must be given before any interroga-
tion.118 In addition, all persons interrogated must be advised of 
the right to an interpreter. If the person requests counsel, no 
further questions may be asked until the attorney arrives or 
until two hours have passed at which time the questioning may 
begin again. As to the questioning of other witnesses, the code 
declares that measures for the protection of witnesses must be 
taken where justified, including provisions for anonymous wit-
nesses. 
Rights guaranteed under what would be the Fourth and Fifth 
Constitutional Amendments in the United States are code-
based in Haiti. The key provisions are that evidence seized 
without a warrant is inadmissible. Warrants must be based on 
“reasonable motives.” The proposed code is very specific about 
the content of any warrant and the exceptions. For example, 
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immediate danger to a person in the place of search will excuse 
the necessity for a warrant. There is also a provision that law 
enforcement must avoid unnecessary modes of intrusion such 
as the “knock first” rule and restrictions on execution of war-
rants between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. Also based upon “reasonable 
motives,” there are specified limitations on the search of a per-
son or an automobile without a warrant. 
Expert witnesses may be requested by the parties or the in-
vestigating judge. The procedures for the request are outlined 
in the Code. The provisions are very detailed, right down to the 
oath that the witness must take. The Code even specifies the 
medicolegal extent of autopsies. DNA examinations must be 
done pursuant to warrant.   
In all criminal matters, the accused is first declared to be un-
der “judicial control.” The preliminary judge (“juge de l’enquête 
et des libertés”) may impose a restriction from a long list of pos-
sible restraints upon the accused. All of those restrictions can 
be reviewed or modified upon demand, with special provisions 
for modification of pretrial conditions after the case has passed 
from the investigation to the trial stage, meaning after a find-
ing of probable guilt has been made. The investigative judge 
may order pretrial detention in “exceptional” cases, where the 
accused is subject to at least three years of imprisonment upon 
conviction, or where the accused has violated the conditions of 
pretrial release. These decisions are subject to appeal. The de-
tention cannot exceed “a reasonable duration,” which is defined 
as either four or six months depending on the seriousness of 
the crime, with the usual provisions for an extension if in con-
formity with a lengthy set of criteria.119 
No witness is required to incriminate himself. Statements of 
witnesses made before trial are available to refresh a witness’ 
recollection, but may not be put to substantive use. In a section 
called “Rules of Evidence,” relevance is required and there are 
prohibitions against cumulative evidence, evidence unlawfully 
seized or coerced, privileged information, evidence of prior sex-
ual behavior, uncounseled confessions, and “proof which dam-
ages the integrity or equity of the proceedings or the rights of 
the accused.” 
The court for minor offenses (“tribunal correctionnel”) will be 
composed of one judge. Cases will be placed on the docket pur-
suant to citation or garde à vue. Civil parties can use the crim-
inal proceeding to sue for damages. A decision as to guilt or in-
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nocence will also include an amount for damages. More serious 
offenses will be tried in tribunaux criminels presided over by a 
judge or jury, as previously described. Verdicts are by majority 
vote. The least serious offenses (“contraventions”) will be tried 
by justices of the peace. The judge of the investigatory phase 
cannot participate in the trial (incompatibilité). All trials and 
preliminary hearings are to be public and in the presence of the 
defendant. Audio or visual recording, in the judge’s discretion, 
is required unless there are “precise” written minutes. 
Appellate rights are also set forth, providing not only an ap-
peal of right but also that the appeal will be de novo and not 
simply restricted to a review of questions of law.120 The Code 
also makes provisions for writs of habeas corpus specifying 
when a prisoner must be released from custody, for extradition 
of defendants to other countries under international agree-
ments, and for the special treatment of juveniles. 
IX. INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM IN HAITI 
It is obvious that any reform to the Criminal Law and Proce-
dure Codes must be accompanied by training and increased ca-
pabilities by all justice actors. In the judiciary, the Superior 
Judiciary Council awaits a filling of eight vacancies,121 the Ju-
dicial Inspection Unit (“JIU”) and the Academy for the Train-
ing of Judges (“École de la Magistrature”) must be reorganized 
and strengthened.122 The Cour de cassation has a number of 
vacancies.123 All need both human and financial resources.124 
As to the attorneys who will now take lead roles in the conduct 
of criminal cases, training in the new system, resources for ad-
equate salaries and facilities, and coordination with the police 
and court personnel will be fundamental. This is particularly 
true if the guarantee of adequate defense counsel is to have any 
meaning. Since Haiti has no tradition of public defense, a pub-
lic defender’s office composed of trained and adequately funded 
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personnel will be essential. Until now, the bar associations 
have been expected to provide pro bono counsel in criminal cas-
es, however, in many areas of the country, there are no bar as-
sociations whatsoever. Where they do exist, support has been 
woefully inadequate.125 
To acculturate the practicing bar to the new way of trying 
cases, there needs to be massive reeducation, starting in the 
law schools. Projects envisaging advocacy training in the law 
school curriculum should be encouraged. The bar associations, 
both in Port-au-Prince and in the principal political subdivi-
sions, called départements, should also develop a variety of 
training programs to train its present members. Classes and 
tutorials in oral procedure, investigative techniques, direct and 
cross-examination, and legal argument would be necessary. In-
ternationals can be of particular assistance in this aspect of 
training. 
This is not to overlook the essential element that the office of 
the public prosecutor, through the Ministry of Justice or inde-
pendently, must retool to oversee any reform process to assure 
its integrity.126 Key to the effective functioning of the party sys-
tem is the independence of the prosecutor. As an organ of the 
executive, there could always be attempts at interference with 
prosecutorial authority in ways that would not even be at-
tempted with the judiciary. Prosecutors will also have to be 
trained in investigative techniques and supervision of the in-
vestigating police. With little experience in actual investiga-
tion, one can anticipate a continuing over-reliance on defendant 
confessions. At some point, however, prosecutors will have to 
learn how to conduct on-the-scene forensic investigations inde-
pendently and how to supervise the police, who will also need 
training. 
As much hesitation as there is in Haiti about such a major 
transfer of power from the judge to the prosecutor, there is, 
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nonetheless, a consensus view the new code represents a major 
improvement in the human rights guarantees of the defend-
ant.127 Much of the success of the new Code will depend on the 
good will and talent of prosecutors who now must bring and 
possibly dismiss charges; honor all the constitutional and hu-
man rights provisions regarding search and seizure, preventive 
detention, and speedy trial; and supervise the investigating po-
lice in the collection and preservation of evidence. One can ex-
pect resistance from several quarters, including from the Hai-
tian judicial police.128 Haitian judicial authorities have tradi-
tionally operated largely as independent units—judge, prosecu-
tor, and police—and not as components of a single system.129 
Justices of the peace in Haiti are the local judges who sit in 
judgment of all offenses that are not serious felonies.130 The 
justices are normally not trained legal professionals. This re-
sults not only in a lack of uniformity but also in violations of 
fundamental human rights by justices who are insensitive to, 
or unschooled in, basic guarantees. This creates a particularly 
dangerous human rights situation since justices of the peace 
handle fully 80% of all cases outside Port-au-Prince.131 To make 
matters worse, Haitian judicial authorities do not require that 
justices of the peace separate the judicial function from their 
other common role as judicial police (the double casquette).132 
There have been training programs for justices of the peace in 
the past—most of them unsuccessful attempts at creating a 
culture change in administration of local justice. This time, the 
training needs to be part of and simultaneous with a nation-
wide effort at broad reform so that the justices know that this 
is not just one more foreign attempt to change how they have 
always done things.133 
Since investigation of crime should eventually fall to the po-
lice (under prosecutorial supervision), whether it be the judicial 
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police or other duly constituted enforcement agency, it goes 
without saying that training, equipment, and salary increases 
are absolutely necessary. For example, forensic evidence is vir-
tually unknown in Haiti for lack of training and resources. Be-
yond that, if the prosecutors are to oversee investigation, work-
ing with the police and carrying cases through trial, there must 
be guarantees of independence and freedom from retaliation, 
professional or otherwise. One suggestion is that an Office of 
the Attorney General be created to oversee prosecutorial ca-
reers and their functioning within the trial and appellate sys-
tem.134 
Case management systems are noticeably absent as well. 
There is no uniform system for registering or filing cases or 
case records. There is no coordination between court adminis-
trators and the prison system. There is a lack of communica-
tion between the local centers and Port-au-Prince. Police have 
no way to know of a suspect’s criminal record. Prison authori-
ties have no way to learn of court dates.135 For that matter, 
there is a lack of basic office supplies. Again, international as-
sistance would be crucial, as it has been in many Latin coun-
tries, to establish a uniform records maintenance and commu-
nication system. In Haiti, however, there has traditionally been 
a reluctance to fund infrastructure because of concerns about 
sustainability.136 
Since much of this reform process centers on the political will 
to spend the resources necessary to give the criminal justice 
system a new foundation, it is noteworthy that the new Presi-
dent, Michel Martelly, has announced that he intends to re-
spect the separation of powers between the executive and the 
judiciary and that, despite indications to the contrary, he be-
lieves the reforms to the justice sector should continue.137 In 
January 2012, President Martelly reconstituted the reform 
commissions, naming some new members, maintaining René 
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Magloire as vice-president, and continuing the mandate for two 
years.138 
There is some degree of importance to the rapidity with 
which the reforms are instituted. This is a period of wholesale 
transformation in Haiti: in commerce, agriculture, government, 
labor, and housing. A complete reform of the criminal law and 
procedure system should be integrated into this era of change 
in the country. External funding is probably more available 
now and in the short-term than it will be in the long-term. 
Finding that the executive and the parliament are attuned to 
and capable of making major changes should be more attrac-
tive to funders than the piecemeal reforms that do little to ad-
dress the kind of impunity that has endemically marked the 
system.139 
X. DEVELOPING THE SOCIAL CONSENSUS 
All parties in Haiti understand that the legal recognition of 
human and procedural rights does not at all guarantee their 
enforcement in practice.140 Several transition efforts in other 
countries of Latin America have at least temporarily halted be-
cause of the failure to recognize that any codification must be 
accompanied not only by structural reform, as discussed, but 
also be a wide-ranging campaign of public education and dis-
cussion.141 That discussion must be carried to the local level, 
which is where most people encounter the criminal justice sys-
tem. At that level, there must be a series of town hall-type ses-
sions, seminars, school programs, and even debates in civil so-
ciety to not only understand the new Codes, but to recognize a 
new morality implicit in the Codes. In this aspect of the reform, 
as with the infrastructural reforms, the international commu-
nity plays a key role but a role that must be directed by the 
Haitian actors at every stage.142 
The Haitian people are accustomed to seeing flowery and en-
lightened prose in new laws emanating from Port-au-Prince. 
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What they are not accustomed to seeing is any attempt to ask 
their opinion about the changes and what those revisions mean 
for rebuilding the society according to a more humane and val-
ue-based model. Those discussions may raise the hopes and 
consciousness of the people enough to defeat endemic cynicism 
and give the reforms a chance to work. “[S]uch a consciousness, 
if fully rooted, constitutes the most permanent and efficacious 
barrier against the enemies of human dignity.”143 
The discussion of moral principles that govern us as citizens 
is an exciting one and should be even more exciting in a coun-
try like Haiti, which is only now seeing the importance of the 
dialogue. The debate in connection with this project entails not 
only parsing out the provisions, particularly the human rights 
guarantees, but also delving into the social constructs that in-
form the Codes. The concepts of “due process of law” can be 
placed in juxtaposition to the deprivations wreaked by the 
state’s coercive methods, which have, for years, dominated the 
political agenda. Notions of justice, truth, and impartiality 
should be resurrected to allow a sort of cleansing process, much 
like many nations have attempted in truth commissions.144 
In “advanced” democracies, elected representatives of the 
people, the media, the executive, and the courts normally lead 
the discussion. In Haiti, the discussion will be more difficult 
quite simply because that foundation of trust or confidence in 
the wisdom of leaders is almost entirely absent. The channels 
of participation must be widened. The debates must be sharp-
ened, the discourse more rational. The deterioration of political 
parties hinders such discourse. The preference of the corporate 
interests in having their discussions with the government in 
private is a major disadvantage to both the Haitian people and 
a democratic reform process.145 The international community 
must be included but controlled. The draw of the charismatic 
leader is often dangerous as it leads to over-confidence among a 
people starving for honest and competent leadership. Finally, 
the tradition of dictatorship has in essence stifled the voice of 
all but a few of the Haitian people. The major motivating factor 
for this silence, which is the fear of the people in speaking out, 
must be overcome. 
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Haiti has never been a deliberative democracy. One can easi-
ly understand why, given the almost unfathomable series of 
indignities inflicted on the Haitian people. How can one ration-
ally discuss a legal system when privation and need abound? 
How can the government expect support and cooperation from 
the people when the legitimacy and moral justification of the 
government is itself largely rejected? When public servants are 
perceived as corrupt and authoritarian, how can any legislative 
work-product gain popular acceptance? How can the interna-
tional community be trusted when, for so long, other countries 
have exploited Haiti, its people and its land for profit? These 
are all impressive theoretical mountains to climb. 
In Haiti, the criminal law and procedure system is more im-
portant than what appears on the surface. A popular discussion 
can succeed if the people agree that the system can be changed 
and that, at the end of the process, Haiti can take its place as a 
country governed by the rule of law. Popular discussions have 
happened before in Haiti.146 This time, that focus could be hu-
man rights and the criminal justice system. With the attention 
of the population and the government focused, the internation-
al community will finally understand that the Haitian people 
will not simply adopt the foreign vision of democracy. It is up to 
the Haitian people themselves to dictate the terms of their fu-
ture. In the meantime, it is important for the international 
community to assist the reform process in a concrete way, but 
also to celebrate the dedication of the Haitian lawyers who still 
work today to institute a reform that is fundamental to rebuild-
ing their country. 
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